نوع مقاله : مقاله علمی پژوهشی
عنوان مقاله English
نویسندگان English
Can the sharing of elements of two worlds in nature establish the numerical unity of natural place and, consequently, the impossibility of multiple worlds? By denying the necessity of the world’s sphericity, the necessity of a vacuum, and the uniformity of the natural tendencies of things of the same nature, Khwaja Nasir al-Din al-Tusi challenges the premises of the arguments against the multiplicity of worlds. These objections are presented by Allama Hilli in Kashf al-Murad. The present study examines the extent to which al-Tusi’s objections suffice to refute Avicenna’s arguments. Using conceptual analysis and critical reconstruction of the arguments, it evaluates al-Tusi’s responses in relation to the principles set out in al-Samaʾ wa-l-ʿAlam. The findings indicate that positing an intermediate body or an encompassing celestial sphere, although it calls the necessity of a vacuum into question, does not establish the independence of two worlds. Likewise, the assumption of multiple natural places leaves unanswered the question of how independent centers are individuated, while the assumption that the second world differs in nature complicates the application of the principle “the same judgment applies to two similar things” (ḥukm al-mithlayn wāḥid). Accordingly, al-Tusi’s objections are defensible as demands for proof and as critiques of the arguments’ premises, but, as formulated, they are insufficient to refute Avicenna’s arguments in their entirety. This assessment, however, does not entail the ultimate validity of Avicenna’s physical principles.
کلیدواژهها English