نوع مقاله : مقاله علمی پژوهشی
عنوان مقاله English
نویسنده English
In The Moral Problem, Michael Smith presents a puzzle arising from the apparent inconsistency of three propositions: the objectivity of moral judgments, their practicality (necessary connection with motivation), and Humean psychology, which treats beliefs and desires as distinct existences. Smith attempts to solve this by reducing the content of moral belief to what a fully rational agent would desire to do. However, this solution faces the fundamental criticism of "belief-desire coherence," articulated by Sayre-McCord, Shafer-Landau, and Suikkanen. Smith claims, without offering a clear criterion, that the belief about one's fully rational self's desire is "coherent" with the corresponding desire and "incoherent" without it, yet he never explains how this coherence is to be measured. Using an analytic-comparative method, this paper first reconstructs and critiques Smith's two main responses to this criticism (the analogy with coherence among beliefs and the epistemic priority strategy), showing them to be unconvincing. Then, drawing on Islamic philosophy and theology (including the unity of the soul, independent practical reason, intrinsic goodness and badness (al-husn wa al-qubh), derived perceptions (al-iʻtibārīyāt), and the theory of faith), it argues that within this framework, moral belief is itself motivating, and there is no need for the unexplicated concept of "coherence." The findings indicate that this criticism poses a fundamental structural problem for Smith's project. The conclusion is that Islamic foundations are not only immune to this criticism but also offer an alternative model for explaining objectivity, practicality, and moral motivation, thus preserving the authority of moral requirements without falling into
کلیدواژهها English