The Study of Ishtiyaque Haji’s View about the Necessity of Alternative Possibilities for Moral Obligations

Document Type : Original Article

Author

Associate Researcher, Department of Comparative Islamic Studies and Religions, Imam Reza International Research Institute, Al-Mustafa International University, Mashhad, Iran

Abstract

There have been many discussions about the necessity of alternative possibilities for moral responsibility in the contemporary literature of free will, but we do not see much discussion about the necessity of alternative possibilities for other types of moral judgments. "Ishtiyaque Haji" has tried to compensate for this gap in several works. In this regard, he argues that moral obligations require alternative possibilities. In order to achieve this goal, by citing some intuitive principles such as equivalence principle, Kant's law/obligation and Kant's law/impermissible, he formulates arguments that show moral obligations such as "must", "wrongness" and "rightness" need alternative possibilities. The present article, with a descriptive and analytical method, after a brief look at Haji's arguments, has reviewed his answers to one of the most important problems raised against the intuitive principles that form the basis of his arguments. The results of the research indicate that his argument about the realization of moral blameworthiness in situations free of objective moral obligation is not acceptable.

Keywords

References

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